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Cripto-Rational Choice or Complex Mechanisms? 
 




In their 2012 paper, Jepperson and Meyer (JM) proposed a critique of the micro-level 
mechanisms-based explanation, arguing that when Methodological Individualism is 
presented as an all-purpose and self-sufficient matrix for social theory the resulting posture 
is a “microchauvinist” one. This posture – the argument goes on – is present to varying 
degrees in, for example, the work of Abell (1997), Coleman (1990), Elster (1989), Hechter 
(1989), and Hedström and Swedberg (1998): <<Here the claim is that social scientific 
explanation must reason through causal processes that reach to the presumed bottom-line 
of the person, conceived as a sharply defined purposive “actor”>> (JM, p. 57). Felin, Foss 
and Abell (FFA) (this issue) argue back that Methodological Individualism is the: <<natural 
starting point for understanding collective phenomena and structures because it attempts 
to unpack the constituent and component parts, their underlying interests, beliefs, 
preferences, strategies and interactions and to theorize how phenomena, structures, 
institutions and so forth are generated, maintained and evolve (………)>> . Further 
elaborations on both sides are available in the pro and cons debate about “analytical 
sociology” (Hedström and Bearman 2009) hosted by this journal (Sociologica, 1, 2012). 
JM propose to complement methodological individualism with socio-organizational 
processes (SOP) and institutional processes (IP). JM admit that: <<(…) all causal social 
processes work through the behaviors and ideas of individual persons (…) this “ontological 
truism” is a basic premise of all post-Hegelian naturalist social science. But this premise 
(sometimes called “ontological individualism”) in no way necessitates an explanatory (or 
“methodological”) individualism.>> FFA maintain instead that explanatory power realizes 
only through actions and interactions, and macro-level accounts should never be conceived 
as rock-bottom explanations. 
Both positions have fresh analytical insights to offer as well as shortcomings worth to be 
highlighted, with – in our opinion – FFA doing better for clarity and precision and JM being 
bolder in raising challenging topics. In this essay, we will provide an introduction to the 
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broader debate raised by JM and FFA stressing differences, misunderstandings and 
(hopefully) perspectives for integration. 
 
1. Is Complexity a Simple Concept? 
 
To begin with, macro-level social factors as the ones mentioned by JM are really at the core 
of whether kind of sociology. However, to produce lists of cunning conjectures does not 
necessarily imply sound explanatory statements: an inventory of plausible mechanisms can 
easily transform itself into a set of “big narratives” where everything is equally key for the 
explanation of the phenomena. In other words, macro-level explanatory accounts must 
specify and detail the how mechanisms through which the macro-level change (or stability) 
occurs. To produce a long list of plausible factors, dimensions and variables such as groups 
values, roles, prestige patterns, emotional dynamics, interactions rituals chain, 
organizational cultures it’s certainly useful but it’s hardly enough from an explanatory 
viewpoint. 
It follows that the plausible SOP & IP processes should make sense of the fine-grained 
mechanisms or “powerful particulars” – to borrow a “critical realist” notion – able to 
generate the phenomena of interest: every causally relevant research program must therefore 
include a syntactical dimension (Abbott, 2004). Without it, the “multilevel” schemas 
supported by JM may obscure, rather than clarify, social processes. For instance, to argue 
that a multilevel approach of the nexus between protestant ethic and spirit of capitalism 
must “contextualize” the reform in broader societal processes, such as: (i) the weakening of 
old roles and the emergence of new ones, less constrained by “liturgical” routines and codes; 
(ii) the decline of imperial legitimacy and the rise of nation-state; (iii) the strengthening of 
the secular normative order in place of the religious one and, finally, (iv) the new mundane 
obligations correlated to the emergent set of duties and salvations ideas, seems more a 
reaction against the “sociological dandyism” or playing-with-models1 as an end in itself 
                                                 
1 Goldthorpe (2003, 101) has referred to “sociological dandyism” as: “a 
preoccupation with models, whether statistical or theoretical, on account more of 
their intrinsic elegance, refinement and subtlety than of what can be shown to 
follow from their sociological use that is of major substantive relevance, whether 
from the standpoint of pure or applied interests”. 
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attitude that sometimes characterize the formal-analytical approaches they criticize, rather 
than to offer a theoretical alternative to them.   
At the same time, JM raise a key topic when arguing that the ontological truism stating that 
just individuals exists must not be confused with the explanatory individualism (see also 
Udehn 2001). When this happens – and this is a major disagreement with FFA – the micro-
foundation of social processes may result in a waste of time, bringing in “causally irrelevant 
material”. This is actually an apt point that any methodological individualist should not 
ignore. To rephrase it: from an explanatory viewpoint, the “variance” of roles-set may be 
more important than the “variance” of actions associated with these roles. It goes without 
saying that “roles” do not produce any effect without “actions”: but in this case “actions” 
matter only in an ontological sense, not in an explanatory one. JM put it clearly: “One does 
not need to assume very much about values or personality to understand that young 
persons in the 1990s might have seen investment banking as an attractive career (p. 63)”.  
 
2. Position Matters 
 
To dig deeper let us briefly consider the vacancy-chain/position argument raised en passant 
by JM (p. 62). Positions can be defined as “empty places” endowed with specific properties 
(such as material and symbolic advantages, rights to act and power) independent of 
people’s characteristics. Positions: “exist prior to the interaction of individuals filling these 
positions” (Udehn 2001, 305) and their structural effect arises in two ways (Sørensen 1996, 
1334): firstly the location of people in a given social structure affects their micro-level 
parameters. In labour market research, for instance, the incentives structure of the internal 
markets affects workers’ efforts and skills. Secondly, positions create effects independently of 
the characteristics of individuals. As wages and rewards in a job are thus not determined by 
the incumbent’s individual resources and productivity, but by being attached to 
qualifications or positions (Petersen 2004, 30). We may not be able to explain many macro-
level phenomena (inequality and distribution of assets above all) without knowing about 
the properties of the positions people occupy. Petersen summarizes the vacancy 
competition model as follows (2004, 30): 
(1) There is a fixed occupational structure, characterized by a distribution of jobs; 
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(2) Opportunities to get ahead will be determined by the rate at which vacancies in the 
occupational structure open up, through turnover, job creation, and others; 
(3) People differ in the job-relevant resources they possess (e.g. human capital, experience), 
which help them to compete for positions in the occupational structure; 
(4) People want to get ahead in the structure (the action part); 
(5) The rate at which opportunities to get ahead open up in the occupational structure varies 
systematically between demographic groups. 
Points 1-2-5 specify structural properties, while points 3-4 refer to individual properties (see 
also Barbera 2012). In the light of JM paper, the “variance” of positions and their properties 
matters more than the “variance” of micro-level properties. JM would argue that 
downstream positions matters for explanatory purposes, while upstream workers do not. 
To detail the micro-level processes would imply to “bring in causally irrelevant materials”. 
But if what counts is the “variance of roles” and not the “variance of actions”, it follows that 
actors adopt a role and follow the prescribed behavioral patterns in quite a deterministic 
way: the subjective interpretations and the “degree of freedom” that roles leave for actions 
has to be ignored, pace R.K. Merton and – let us say – every post-functionalist sociology.  
This lead to the more general topic we wish to raise: the simpler the micro-level assumptions 
and the associated model of actor, the easier is to rely on macro-level explanations. 
Paradoxically, the best way to support macro-level explanations is to postulate a rational-
choice model where action adapt just to constraints and opportunities.  The vacancy-chain 
model, for instance, simply requires a “need for achievement” attitude and a blatantly 
rational exploitation of the career opportunities within organized settings. 
 
3. Keep it Simple, Stupid (KISS, but not too much) 
 
We claim that - to work as they are meant to do – most often macro-level explanations such 
as competitive niches (Hannan and Freeman 1989), fields (Fligstein 2001), complex networks 
(White 2001; 2008) and chains of positions (Sorensen 1996) implicitly assume rational choice 
models. Competitive niches reward evolutionary selection, in one form or in the other a 
cognate concept of market and rationality (Nelson and Winter 1982); fields are arenas for 
power-driven interactions, strongly based on “strategic interaction as the key habitus” 
(Bourdieu 1993); chains of opportunities affect organizational dynamics through 
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tournaments or competition for the vacant position (Petersen 2004); networks offer context 
of opportunities, information and rewards (Burt 1982).  
To this point, FFA oppose a sound argument: where JM support the idea that micro-
foundation is irrelevant to grasp “complex” processes, FFA maintain exactly the opposite. 
Micro-foundation is crucial just because social processes are complex and, as soon as this 
complexity is properly considered, the risk of a crypto-rational choice remains remote.  
For instance, consider organizational demography, which have extended the idea of 
vacancy-chain to include a variety of organizational structures (e.g., Stewman and Konda 
(1983) and Stewman (1986). Here job distributions, vacancy chains and managerial staffing 
and hiring practices shape a compound structure of probabilities for advancement. These 
probabilities structure are then modelled to construct organizational “Venturi tube”s, which 
specify the relative career chances over the entire organizational hierarchy (Chase 1991, 146) 
(cf. fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 Three possible shapes for Venturi Tubes in a mobility system with four strata 
 
 
Chase 1991, 147 
 
The Venturi tubes pictured in Fig. 1 show that individual chances of promotion may take 
different forms and, moreover, these are not isomorphic to formal organizational structure: 
“Pyramidal organizations often do not have pyramidal chances for promotion” (Stewman 
1986). Therefore, individual chances of promotion can not be inferred from the formal 
organizational structure. These issues point to radical uncertainty for intentional actors that 
prevents careers from being governed by the maximization decisions assumed in a rational 
choice theory (Beckert 2002). Even a bounded rationality approach (Simon 1982) in which 
vacancies are formalized as processes where an individual when thinking about moving up 
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only evaluates the next vacant position is not always convincing. In fact, in organized 
settings inter-temporal discount rates are usually quite low. Broadly speaking, one could 
argue that human’s career projects include long-term perspectives through which individuals 
image themselves over time. In these cases, to take decisions is to necessarily deal with the 
organization of time beyond the immediate present (Pizzorno 2006, 388).  
Organizational careers, hence, are characterized by logics of action where people have long-
term perspectives, but these cannot be understood as rational choice decisions. Other kinds 
of mechanisms about one’s chances of promotion will play a key role in this case: e.g., career 
as an end in itself; promotion as an indicator of collective identity and homophily; job career 
as a kind of “moral progress”. Besides instrumental rationality, in this way both the 
cognitive and normative dimensions of social action can be included in a “broader” model 
of rational action (Boudon 1993; Manzo 2012). 
All in all the interplay between micro and macro complexity should accordingly work as a 
“no-fly zone” where contenders find perspectives for integration. Methodological 
individualist should be ready to admit that micro-level processes may matter just in 
ontological terms but they may be weak in explanatory ones, being only a “convenient 
device” to make sense of macro-level properties and their change over time and space. 
Approaches such as the ones of JM should on the other hand deal more seriously with the 
syntactical dimension of social processes and, in doing this, really avoid "big narratives" that 
actually may hidden crypto rational-choice accounts.  
 
4. Other Kinds of Complexity 
 
The interplay between macro and micro complexity would also help not to overweight the 
role of “culture” and to describe institutional processes (IP) as self-generating systems, 
where ideas seems to “act” as they were human beings. For instance, at p. 65 JM write: 
“Calvinism appears to have provided new models of social discipline and executive 
administration”, or “protestant cultural model gave concrete legitimacy to a wide range of 
collective projects”. And also: “(t)he institutionalizations of religious pluralism contributed 
to the conventionalization of intellectual pluralism.”. In these examples, IP appear as they 
were processes of transformation of “systems of symbols” in other “systems of symbols”: 
ideas, frames, meanings and values seems to be able to intrinsically transform themselves 
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and produce effects over time. These processes are described without taking into 
consideration the role of actions and interactions that channel them, as in the case of 
diffusion and contagion of ideas (see Coleman et alii, 1957; Hedström 1998). 
This “idealistic” slant is therefore at odds with the “post-Hegelian naturalist social science” 
JM declare to embrace and, we believe, it has a further negative consequence for it separates 
IP from SOP: ideas seems to have an endogenous transformative power not only because 
they endogenously “act” without actors, but also because the complex interplay between 
networks, institutions and “culture” is not properly considered. The set of “big narratives” 
seems therefore to produce a new “phenomenology of the spirit” mixed with historicist 
accounts and supplied with multi-level schemas.  
To be clear, we agree with the need to introduce cultural mechanisms in the macro-micro-
macro schemas (Barbera and Negri 2015); and we find convincing those approaches that 
deal rigorously with the cultural meaning of actions (Lizardo 2006), providing sound 
explanations of symbols, non-intentional behavior and alike (Gross 2009; see Manzo 2010 
for a reply). The explanation of the meaning of social action can and should be included in 
the macro-micro-macro framework, even with regard to its most complex implications such 
as social identity and non-intentional processes. We support the idea that the mainstream 
conception of macro-micro mechanisms does not pay enough attention to the issue of social 
identity, recognition processes and comparability among actions (Edling and Rydgren 2014; 
Pizzorno 2006). In other words, the bottom left-hand corner of the Coleman Boat in the 
approaches JM criticize often implies pre-formed actors, without accounting for the cultural 
and symbolic dimensions of social processes that constitute them as such2. For example, 
often agents reflexively ask themselves about their own preferences: they do not merely 
desire something, but rather they question how much these desires are “correct”, as in the 
case of a “life-plan” (Frankfurt 1971). These "meta-preferences" refer back to those social 
processes that preside over the genesis of trans-individual evaluation criteria or categories, 
which in turn refer back to the origin and function of comparability schemes between 
actions and agents (Barbera and Negri 2015).  
                                                 
2 This does not mean that the issues of social identity and recognition processes are excluded from the frame of analytical 
sociology. For instance Manzo (2012, 44), argues that individual's desire to possess and to defend a well-defined social 
identity has to be considered as a “reason triggers” mechanism, based on cognitive “good reasons” à la Boudon (ibidem, 
52). Nonetheless, actors – and their identity-based wishes – are always pre-formed entities (e.g. actors have an identity 
and social circles just confirm or disconfirm it).  
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Comparability schemas among actions are symbolic and social representations and not 
components of intentional and goal-oriented actions: they rather are “an expression of being 
and belonging” whose symbolic meaning it’s acknowledged by other agents for its fitting 
to an institutionalized system of rules, regardless the intentions of the agent. As we know, 
a representation as a symbolic expression needs an appropriate context: a cut in a canvas is 
not always recognized as a work of art! As Searle (2005) wrote, X stands for Y in Z, because 
X to be a symbol for Y needs a context Z. These conditions are alike to being able to classify 
colors when there is light. We cannot state that someone who sees colors intends to see them. 
Rather, seeing colors is a way of being inherently human, which occurs under appropriate 
light conditions quite independently of the agent’s intentions.  
We maintain that these are crucial points for a sound sociological explanation, but we also 
claim that all these issues should be understood avoiding the trap of both idealism and 
historicism, as well as deriving from these concepts clear explanatory statements with a 
syntactical backbone.  
 
5. Terra Incognita: Hic Sunt Leones? 
 
All in all we agree with FFA criticism because it seems to us an effective safeguard against 
both the traps of idealism and historicism. FFA, we maintain, rightly criticizes the unduly 
statement of JM according to which: 1) Methodological Individualism would be based on a 
false micro-level assumption, namely that exist a mass of similar [or “modal”] individuals", 
whose actions aggregate through market-like mechanisms; 2) Organized complexity and 
individual-level relations that are too heterogeneous or complex to theorize at the micro-
level support accordingly a macro-to-macro explanation. FFA do not agree with this 
conclusion and support the opposite viewpoint: <<if individuals (…) interact in a simple 
manner, than we may indeed be able to dispense with them (…) and their interaction and 
focus -as J&M advocate - upon macro-relations>>. In other words, as we already claimed, a 
direct macro-to-macro link is more plausible assuming homogeneous actors and simple 
additive micro-to-macro mechanisms, as in rational-choice accounts. For instance, let's 
assume a situation where “rationality” is the common factor shared amongst individuals – 
as in the so-called "representative agent” device -  while “irrational” factors are randomly 
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distributed amongst the individuals and they will accordingly cancel each other out in the 
micro-to-macro aggregation process. Goldthorpe (2000, 105), puts this case clearly: 
 
<< Suppose that in their actions in some respect the members of an aggregate or 
collectivity are subject, on the one hand, to an influence that bears on all alike and, on the 
other hand, to a variety of influences not deviating systematically from the common 
influence and bearing only on particular individuals or small groups. It can be shown that 
even if the common influence is clearly weaker than the idiosyncratic influences taken 
together, knowledge of the former is still likely to allow a large part of the variation in the 
behaviour of the aggregate to be accounted for. This result comes about (…) essentially 
because the effects of the idiosyncratic influences tend to cancel out and thus leave the effect 
of the common influence, even if relatively weak, as still the decisive ones at the aggregate 
level.>>  
 
But, as Edling notes: <<In order for the “systematic force” to leave a trace in the aggregate, 
it is required that we have uncorrelated residuals. Otherwise we cannot assume that we are 
dealing with a genuine effect. Substantially, this implies an assumption of atomistic agents, 
i.e. individual without social ties>> (Edling 2000, 5). In sum, the “idiosyncratic forces” must 
be assumed as randomly distributed in the population and the assumption of simple and 
atomised actors follows accordingly.  
Be true as is it may, these simple micro-level assumptions may – as we argued previously – 
justify the irrelevance of micro-foundation. In atomized settings, where interaction does not 
occur, macro-level change can be easily described as straight macro-to-macro links: e.g. 
direct links between the change of constraints at time T and the (aggregate) choices at time 
T+1. Here the paradox: the best way to support macro-level explanations is to postulate a 
simple rational-choice model where action adapt in an atomistic manner just to constraints 
and opportunities. On the contrary, in a population of non-atomised actors it is impossible 
to assume that the idiosyncratic factors are randomly distributed, because people tend to 
interact with people alike. Or, but the conclusion is the same, repeated interaction makes 
people alike. In such (more “complex”) cases, micro-level foundation is key to properly 
explain macro-level phenomena.  
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All in all – as we remarked -  it seems more correct to assume that organized complexity and 
micro-level heterogeneity require to model different kinds of “interaction regimes”, while 
simpler micro-level situations – such as the one presupposed by rational-choice models – 
do not. In this vein, FFA correctly emphasize that MI deals with the idea of: "how diverse 
and heterogeneous interests, beliefs and expectations are (somehow) aggregated in various 
way - leading (or not) to collective equilibria" (p.4).  
This being said, we also claim that FFA perspective remain confined within a too narrow 
analytical space. FFA do not take seriously enough (or so it seems to us) the crucial insights 
of JM according to which  macro-micro mechanisms that support the genesis of social 
identities, recognition patterns and comparability schemes in social action need to be 
included in the macro-micro-macro schema they favor. Consequently, FFA frame correctly 
the problem of “emergence” and the key role of micro-to-macro mechanisms, where 
collective outcomes can truly be surprising and emergent. Nevertheless, FFA do not deal 
with macro-to-micro mechanisms that constitute the “condition of possibility” of action and 
interaction. Where do actors and comparability schemas among actions come from? In FFA 
perspective actors are always pre-formed entities assumed as “able to act”, for no 
uncertainty in judgment criteria is postulated. But this assumption should never be taken 
for granted. As Pizzorno notes (2006, 392):  
 
<< In addition to the uncertainties that stem from the unpredictable nature of possible 
changes in the state of the world, the subject could also subsequently find himself 
confronted with the possibility that the objective of his choice, at the moment of producing 
a reward, has lost its value. This is not a simple case of regret. The person is not confronted 
with the possible irrationality of a past decision. The decision, at the moment it was made, 
was in all effects rational. But when the outcomes of the choice is appraised, the person 
could find that he no longer holds the same preferences, the same tastes, as when he made 
the choice. In making that choice he aimed to determine his identity, that is, the recognition 
of his social standing. Now it is as if the person finds himself to be another person>>. 
 
Therefore - the argument goes on - the person perceives one of his past acts as belonging to 
an identity that no longer considers his own, and no-one any longer recognizes the values 
that were realized through that choice: <<The currency used to calculate the utility of the 
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choice is now useless, and it can no longer be exchanged for any other. Rationality is not in 
the intention of the agent; it is in the eye of the beholder. Or better, of the participants in a 
social situation>> (Pizzorno, ibidem). 
These arguments urge to consider those macro-micro mechanisms – implicit in JM 
arguments, while disregarded by FFA – which make sense of the macro-micro downward 
causation processes as prerequisites of actions and intentions: namely, generative 
mechanisms of social identity and comparability/evaluation criteria among actions. To this 
end, the concept of “immergence” (Cambell 1974; Andrighetto et alii 2007; Conte et alii 2007) 
may prove useful. Put it succinctly, this concept includes those individual-level properties 
that are non-intentional consequences of the context of interaction in which agents are 
immerged (Baldassarri 2009, p. 403). To restate a metaphor we have already used, if the light 
is switched on, I see colors around me independently of my intentions. This is in line with 
the Latin roots of im-merge, that means to disappear by entering into any medium, such as 
the moon into the shadow of the sun3.   
 
6. Conclusions: Nuts and Bolts for the Analysis of Immergence  
 
We have just outlined as JM standpoint urges to deal with those “immergentist” macro-
micro mechanisms such as the ones described by Pizzorno. We noticed that these 
mechanisms call into the picture the role of “relational contexts” or "circles of recognition" 
in which actors are embedded and that are the sources of their social identity and evaluation 
criteria. But when and how a network structure constitutes a circle of recognition? Is there 
any role for action-like processes? If a methodological individualist should not discard these 
questions as irrelevant, a tentative answer needs to consider the interplay between social 
organizational processes (SOP) and institutional process (IP), a perspective which is lacking 
in JM "multi-level" schemas. On the other hand, FFA seem ready to admit that "common 
values precede rather than follow from social interaction" (p.5), and that this always requires 
an action-like explanatory argument. But their attention is mainly - if not exclusively – 
reserved for the micro-to-macro path, without grasping that similar selection processes and 
                                                 
3 The concept of immergence we refer to therefore differs from the so-called 
“second-order” emergence or “incorporation” in which the emergent effect is 
represented in the producing system, and this representation contributes to 
replicate the effect (Conte et alii 2007, 42). 
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matching mechanisms work also within the macro-to-micro immergentist path, as the  
recognition pattern illustrated by Pizzorno (2006). Other analytical tools serve  similar 
purposes: rituals (Collins 2004), orders of worth (Stark 2009), quality conventions (Boltansky 
and Thevenot 2006), conceptions of control (Fligstein 2001), disciplines and control 
strategies (White 2001; 2008).  
To conclude, let us clarify how the concepts of disciplines and control strategies can both 
illustrate when and how a network configuration matters for the social identity and 
evaluation criteria of the actors and enhance the scope of micro-foundation by making sense 
of those reflexive strategies which support self-selection and matching processes in the 
macro-micro-macro path.  
1) Networks and the constitution of social actor: on the basis of White’s analysis (1992; 2001; 
Azarian 2005 and 2010) a  circle of recognition emerges from networks with structurally 
equivalent nodes. White too states that an individual outside specific relational conditions 
will be prey of “value uncertainty”. Positioned at the intersection of multiple networks that 
link different parts of the social space, the agent is “bombarded” erratically by different and 
contradictory inputs. His position within a network is so specific that “cultural rules” are 
too general and therefore useless as a guide to action. A support could however be the 
comparison with other peers, who are in the same structural situation and exposed to the 
same flow of inputs and perceived constraints. By comparison, actors who feel they are 
structurally equivalent can work out what “normality” is and/or which the standards for 
evaluating actions are (Azarian, 2005). It is by this comparison and control that they can 
generate and reproduce their own (organizational) schemes, which White calls 
“disciplines”. These schemes become a stable mode of action, support a collective identity 
and allocate social roles accordingly. Within a given discipline, agents improve their control 
over erratic flows and uncertainty that afflict them. They share a relatively stable system of 
constraints and norms and acquire a stable framework for action accordingly: a discipline 
therefore allows behaviour’s comparability. Disciplines shape individual identity anchoring 
it to a wider identity, i.e., to a collective profile or to an order of worth (Stark 2009). Whoever 
fits the measures and standards dictated by such a scheme is recognized as a member of the 
discipline: through the effort to act according to a given discipline, agents acquire 




2) Reflexive strategies in the macro-micro-macro process:  consider a situation of semantic 
uncertainty, such as when different orders of worth clash or contradict each other. 
Something (including one’s action) may be considered worth and valuable because it is 
economically profitable, or for the prestige it gives access to, or in connection with the 
traditional principle it represents, or because the public and civic value it stands for. These 
orders of worth may require zero-sum games: more money, less prestige and public goods, 
for instance. In these cases – which are ubiquitous in social life - keeping a tie can be counter-
productive, as it becomes a cause of semantic contradiction that does not guarantee stability 
to one’s action (see Barbera and Audifredi 2008; Barbera and Negri 2015). As White (2008, 
chapter 8) illustrated the so-called “control strategies” play here an important role. Control 
is considered the sum of attempts that agents rely on to control “confusion” as well as the 
contingency of stimuli coming from their social ties (Azarian 2005). A crucial control 
strategy is decoupling, through which agents isolate themselves from undesired ties and 
unwilling dependencies. Actually, the very identity of agents is the non-deterministic result 
of these attempts to control/justify stimuli coming from their social ties. Hence an identity 
asserts itself when agents establish control strategies that last out the contingencies that 
affect them.  
Consider, for example, the creative lifestyles in metropolitan areas (Florida 2005), or the 
political-aesthetic mixes which drive quality enogastronomy (Sassatelli and Davolio 2010). 
In these cases goods take their value from being produced or consumed within a restricted 
circle that attributes value to such choices (Pizzorno 2006). Thanks to this social 
interdependency, agents are inclined to generate a network, which constructs the source of 
value for their own action, thus avoiding the Olson’s paradox (Bellanca 2007, see in 
particular pp. 42–51). Or consider “specialised public goods” that - as pure public goods - 
are non-exclusive and non-rival, but differently from them the user can take full advantage 
only if certain access costs are paid for. For instance, understanding a specific jargon is 
needed to take part in a political coalition. But this jargon it is not a universal public good 
as whoever takes advantage of it has a particularly high entrance cost. “Specialised public 
goods” also avoid the Olson paradox: whoever wants to learn the language for the specific 
sub-group or coalition automatically feeds into the collective network. Coming away from 
the collective action in this case would mean substituting a shared language with a private 
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one. Just like in collective action problems “specialised public goods” also need to deal with 
congestion created by too many participants. The more people who use the specialised 
language that has learnt with great efforts, makes the language more fuzzy. At this point it 
is worthwhile for people who first learnt the specialised language to leave the coalition and 
try to find another. This can occur either attempting to regain a sort of ‘purity’ of the original 
message (Bellanca 2007, pp. 44–51), or negating the validity of the message and so 
renouncing the fruits of the common good. 
Let us conclude highlighting that these last examples seem to fit well FFA point, according 
to which structures and institutions can't be taken as the primitive of social theorizing as 
they are the results of the choices and self-selection processes that precede them. But, as we 
suggested, to fully exploit the analytical implications of this posture the immergentist 
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Despite harsh debates and misunderstandings, macro and micro level explanatory accounts 
have a number of way to reach a better theoretical integration. In this paper, we comment 
on the debate between Jepperson and Meyer vs. Felin, Foss and Abell, to illustrate how 
macro and micro-level explanations deal with the same set of analytical dimensions 
(networks, institutions, positions, meanings) and fundamental mechanisms (matching, self-
selection, individual and collective action). To integrate seemingly opposite theoretical 
postures, we maintain, partisans of macro-level accounts must deal with the syntactical 
dimension of social explanation, while micro-level advocates must consider topics such as 
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